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11. Introduction
In recent years, explicit in°ation-forecast targeting, which takes the form of forward-looking interest
rate feedback rules that set a short-term nominal interest rate in response to the forecasted value of
future in°ation, has become a popular framework for conducting monetary policy at central banks
around the world. This practice began in New Zealand in 1990 and, within a decade, spread to
other industrial countries.1 Since 1997, a number of emerging market and transition countries have
adopted such a policy.2 Many more are moving toward this direction.3 In a sense, forward-looking
in°ation targeting has become a de¯ning characteristic of monetary policymaking worldwide.
There are many reasons for adopting an in°ation-targeting rule in monetary policymaking.4
That it is the expected future in°ation that needs to be targeted has been emphasized by both
policymakers and researchers. Among other advantages, targeting the expected future in°ation is
essential for tackling the observed delay in the response of in°ation and output to monetary policy
actions, for anchoring private sector's in°ation expectations, and for incorporating a wide variety
of up-to-date information in policymaking. In this sense, forward-looking in°ation targeting can be
justi¯ed on the ground of both policy e®ectiveness and central bank accountability and credibility.5
This is why many researchers recommend that central banks commit to forward-looking in°ation
targeting rules and why many policymakers follow suit.6
There is yet a pitfall of forward-looking in°ation targeting: it is prone to real indeterminacy
of equilibrium and therefore welfare-reducing °uctuations unrelated to economic fundamentals.7
1Among these countries are Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Finland, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland,
Iceland, and Norway, all of which publish their in°ation forecasts (Finland and Spain adopted the euro in 1999). The
United States, the European Central Bank, and Japan are usually viewed as having followed some implicit in°ation-
forecast targeting procedures, where more explicit targeting has also received consideration recently. Leiderman and
Svensson, eds. (1995), Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999) provide
some background information and analysis.
2These include Israel (now an industrial country), the Czech Republic, Korea, Poland, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
South Africa, Thailand, Mexico, Turkey, Hungary, Peru, and Philippines, all of which but Mexico publish their
in°ation forecasts. See Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2000), Roger and Stone (2005), and Jonas and Mishkin (2005)
for more details.
3Estimated forward-looking interest rate feedback rules explain well the behavior of interest rates in the United
States, Germany, and Japan in the 1980s and 1990s. See, among others, Chinn and Dooley (1997), Clarida and
Gertler (1997), Orphanides (1998), Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and Gertler (1998), Orphanides and Williams (2003), and Carare
and Stone (2005).
4See, among many others, Haldane, eds. (1995), Blinder, Goodhart, Hildebrand, Lipton, and Wyplosz (2001),
Svensson (2001), Fracasso, Genberg, and Wyplosz (2003), and Leeper (2003).
5See, among others, Svensson (1997), Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Batini and Haldane (1999), Levin, Wieland,
and Williams (2003), Orphanides and Williams (2003), and Bernanke and Woodford, eds. (2005).
6See, among others, Svensson (1997, 1999), Svensson and Woodford (1999), and Goodhart (2000).
7See, among others, Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), Woodford (2000, 2003), and
2Some researchers argue that in°ation-forecast targeting central banks can avoid such policy-induced
instability by appealing to some °exible rules under which a nominal interest rate responds not only
to expected future in°ation but also to other endogenous variables such as current output.8 Their
studies, however, have all abstracted from investment activity. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) argue
that the indeterminacy problem is more severe when investment activity is taken into account.9
They show that essentially all strict in°ation-forecast targeting rules induce real indeterminacy of
equilibrium in a sticky price model with endogenous investment, and they suggest that letting the
interest rate respond also to output would not help much in avoiding such indeterminacy.
The present paper takes up this issue. We start by considering a standard model of sticky prices
with endogenous investment and show that virtually all monetary policy rules that set a nominal
interest rate in response solely to future in°ation are subject to real indeterminacy of equilibrium.
We apply the celebrated Samuelson-Farebrother conditions for handling high order systems of linear
di®erence equations to obtain the necessary and su±cient condition for local real determinacy for
a baseline case of our model economy. This condition reveals that increasing the degree of price
stickiness or letting policy respond also to current output may help ensure a unique equilibrium.10
We ¯nd that the ¯rst channel in itself has a quantitatively negligible e®ect. Once again, almost
all strict forward-looking in°ation-targeting rules that respond solely to future in°ation lead to real
indeterminacy of equilibrium, whether with higher price stickiness, or with higher overall stickiness
through incorporating into the baseline model ¯rm-speci¯c capital, sticky wages, or both.
We ¯nd that the e®ect of the second avenue depends on the elasticity of labor supply and the
degree of stickiness in the model. With high labor supply elasticity and price stickiness, such as
those assumed in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005), indeterminacy is much less likely to occur if policy
responds also to current output. With estimated labor supply elasticity or empirically reasonable
price stickiness, however, policy's response to current output helps little in ensuring determinacy in
the baseline model. Even incorporating ¯rm-speci¯c capital can only make a marginal improvement.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000).
8See, for example, Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), Christiano and Gust (1999), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999),
Woodford (1999, 2003), and Levin et al. (2003). In practice, almost all in°ation targeting central banks follow such
a °exible in°ation-forecast targeting procedure.
9See Huang and Meng (2006) for a related study and Dupor (2001) for a continuous-time analysis.
10Under current-in°ation targeting with endogenous capital accumulation, Sveen and Weinke (2005) ¯nd that
indeterminacy is more likely to occur with a greater degree of stickiness while Sveen and Weinke (2005) and Benhabib
and Eusepi (2005) show that letting policy respond also to current output can help avoid such indeterminacy.
3Incorporating sticky wages, on the other hand, signi¯cantly enhances the role of policy's response to
current output in ensuring determinacy of equilibrium. When both sticky wages and ¯rm-speci¯c
capital are incorporated into the baseline model, even a tiny response of policy to current output
can render equilibrium determinate for a wide range of response of policy to future in°ation. This
last result is important in light of the recent ¯nding by Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2006) which
suggests that interest rate policy rules that feature a large response to output can be a potential
source of signi¯cant ine±ciencies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a sticky price model with
endogenous investment and a capital rental market, presents a necessary and su±cient condition
for local real determinacy, describes model calibration and reports numerical results. Sections 3,
4, and 5 incorporate ¯rm-speci¯c capital, sticky wages, and both ¯rm-speci¯c capital and sticky
wages, respectively, into the baseline model and describes the results. Section 6 concludes. The
Appendix restates the Samuelson-Farebrother conditions and proves our proposition and corollary.
2. A baseline model with staggered prices
The model features a continuum of ¯rms each of which produces a di®erentiated good indexed by
f 2 [0;1]. At each date t, a representative distributor combines all di®erentiated goods fYt(f)gf2[0;1]
into a composite good Yt =
hR 1
0 Yt(f)(²y¡1)=²ydf
i²y=(²y¡1)
; where ²y 2 (1;1) is the elasticity of
substitution between the individual goods. The distributor takes the prices fPt(f)gf2[0;1] of the
di®erentiated goods as given and chooses the bundle of the individual goods to minimize the cost of
fabricating a given quantity of the composite good, which it sells to a representative household at
the unit fabricating cost Pt =
hR 1
0 Pt(f)1¡²ydf
i1=(1¡²y)
, which is also the price level. The resultant
demand for a type f good is
Yt(f) =
·
Pt(f)
Pt
¸¡²y
Yt: (1)
Quantity of the composite good purchased by the household (Yt), which corresponds to real
output or real GDP, can be either consumed (Ct) or invested (It) to accumulate capital stock that
the household rents to ¯rms in a competitive capital market.
4The production of a type f good uses capital and labor and a constant-return-to-scale technology
Yt(f) = Kt(f)®Nt(f)1¡®: (2)
Firms are price takers in factor markets but monopolistic competitors in goods markets. With
markup pricing, factor payments are distorted and ® and 1 ¡ ® determine respectively the share
of payments to capital and labor in value-added production cost rather than in gross output.
Speci¯cally, cost minimization by ¯rms implies that nominal wage rate Wt and nominal marginal
cost MCt are linked as follows:
Wt = (1 ¡ ®)
µ
Nt
Kt
¶¡®
MCt; (3)
and nominal capital rental rate is linked to nominal wage rate by Rk
t = [®=(1 ¡ ®)](Nt=Kt)Wt,
where Nt =
R 1
0 Nt(f)df and Kt =
R 1
0 Kt(f)df, and we have used the fact that labor to capital ratio
and marginal cost are identical across ¯rms in equilibrium. We shall use lowercases wt and mct to
denote real wage and real marginal cost, respectively.
Firms set prices in a staggered fashion µ a lµ a Calvo (1983). At each date, each ¯rm receives a
random signal with a constant probability µp which forbids it to reset price. The random signal is
identically and independently distributed across ¯rms and time. With the large number of ¯rms
which validates the law of large numbers, at each point in time there is fraction (1¡µp) of randomly
selected ¯rms that can reset prices. At date t, if a ¯rm f can reset its price, it chooses P¤
t (f) to
maximize the expected present value of its pro¯ts
1 X
s=t
µs¡t
p R¡1
t;s¡1 [Pt(f) ¡ MCs]
·
Pt(f)
Ps
¸¡²y
Ys;
where Rt;t¡1 ´ 1 and Rt;s¡1 =
Qs¡1
¿=t R¿ denotes a cumulative rate of return from rolling over a
position on the nominal bond from t to s > t. The optimal pricing decision is
P¤
t (f) =
²y
²y ¡ 1
P1
s=t µs¡t
p R¡1
t;s¡1P
²y
s YsMCs
P1
s=t µs¡t
p R¡1
t;s¡1P
²y
s Ys
; (4)
The optimal price is a markup over a weighted average of marginal costs in the current and future
5periods during which the ¯rm is expected not to have another chance to reset price.
The representative household's lifetime utility is given by
1 X
t=0
¯t
Ã
C1¡¾
t ¡ 1
1 ¡ ¾
¡ Ã
N
1+´
t
1 + ´
!
;
where ¯ 2 (0;1) is a subjective discount factor, Nt denotes the household's labor in period t,
and ¾ and ´ denote its relative risk aversion in consumption and in labor hours, respectively. The
household's budget constraint in period t requires that its expenditures on consumption, investment,
and asset accumulation do not exceed its total income earned in the same period,
Pt(Ct + It) + Bt ¡ Rt¡1Bt¡1 · Rk
tKt + WtNt + ¦t;
where Bt¡1 is the household's holding of a one-period nominal bond acquired in period t¡1, Rt¡1 is
the gross nominal rate of return on holding the bond from t¡1 to t, and ¦t is the household's claim
to ¯rms' pro¯ts in period t. The household maximizes its utility subject to the budget constraint,
a convex capital adjustment cost
It
Kt
= I
µ
Kt+1
Kt
¶
; (5)
where ± ´ I(1) 2 [0;1] is the steady-state capital depreciation rate, I0(1) = 1, and ²q ´ I00(1)
denotes the steady-state elasticity of investment to capital ratio with respect to Tobin's q, and a
borrowing constraint Bt ¸ ¡B, for some large positive number B, which serves to prevent the
household from playing Ponzi schemes without bound. The household takes its initial capital stock
K0, bond holding B¡1, and all prices, capital rental rate, and wage rate as given in solving the
utility-maximization problem.11 The optimality conditions include an intertemporal consumption
Euler equation
PtRt
Pt+1
=
1
¯
µ
Ct+1
Ct
¶¾
; (6)
an intratemporal consumption-labor relation
wt = ÃC¾
t N
´
t ; (7)
11The assumption that at any date t the stock of capital Kt is predetermined implies that capital available for
¯rms to rent at any given date is accumulated by the household during the previous period. In other words, additional
capital resulting from the household's investment decision becomes productive with a one-period lag.
6and a capital Euler equation
PtRt
Pt+1
@It
@Kt+1
=
®
1 ¡ ®
Nt+1
Kt+1
wt+1 ¡
@It+1
@Kt+1
: (8)
A monetary authority is able to commit to a in°ation-forecast targeting rule under which the
nominal interest rate responds to the in°ation forecast and current output,
Rt = Rss
µ
Pt+1
Pt
¶¿¼ µ
Yt
Y ss
¶¿y
; (9)
where Rss and Y ss denote respectively the steady-state values of the nominal interest rate and real
output, and ¿¼ ¸ 0 and ¿y ¸ 0 measure respectively the degree of responsiveness of the nominal
interest rate to the deviation of the expected future in°ation from an in°ation target (which is
set to zero) and output around the steady state. With a zero steady-state in°ation rate, we have
Rss = 1=¯, as implied by the steady-state version of (6).
Equations (1)-(9), and those de¯ning the composite good and price level, together with fac-
tor market clearing conditions, Nt =
R 1
0 Nt(f)df and Kt =
R 1
0 Kt(f)df, and the market clearing
condition for the composite good, Yt = Ct + It, characterize an equilibrium.
2.1. Some log-linearized equilibrium conditions
For local determinacy analysis, we examine a log-linearized system of equilibrium conditions around
a steady state with zero in°ation. Throughout the rest of the paper, a variable with a hat denotes
the percentage deviation of the variable in level from its steady-state value. Note that, with a
constant steady-state price level, b ¼p;t ´ log(Pt=Pt¡1) is both the actual period-t price in°ation and
the percentage deviation of the rate of price in°ation in period t from its steady-state value.
The log-linearized versions of the consumption Euler equation (6), the policy rule (9), the
aggregated version of the production function (2), the good market clearing condition, the factor
market relation (3), and the capital Euler equation (8) are, respectively,
b Rt ¡ b ¼p;t+1 = ¾
³
b Ct+1 ¡ b Ct
´
; (10)
b Rt = ¿¼b ¼p;t+1 + ¿yb Yt; (11)
7b Yt = ® b Kt + (1 ¡ ®) b Nt; (12)
b Yt = (1 ¡ ±ky)b Ct + ky
h
b Kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±) b Kt
i
; (13)
b wt = c mct ¡ ®
³
b Nt ¡ b Kt
´
; (14)
~ ±
³
b wt+1 + b Nt+1 ¡ b Kt+1
´
¡ ¾
³
b Ct+1 ¡ b Ct
´
= ²q
h³
b Kt+1 ¡ b Kt
´
¡ ¯
³
b Kt+2 ¡ b Kt+1
´i
; (15)
where ~ ± ´ 1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±) and ky ´ [(²y ¡ 1)®¯]=(²y~ ±), and we have used (10) in rewriting (15).
Conditions (10)-(14) will stay invariant to all modi¯cations to the baseline model that we will
make in the subsequent sections. Note that in the case with no capital adjustment cost, the right-
hand-side of (15) reduces to 0.
The log-linearized version of (7) takes the following form:
b wt = ¾ b Ct + ´ b Nt: (16)
This condition will be replaced with a wage in°ation equation in the subsequent sections where we
incorporate staggered wage-setting into the baseline model.
Approximating and combining the price-setting equation (4) and the equation de¯ning the price
level, we can derive a log-linearized New Phillips curve
b ¼p;t = ¯b ¼p;t+1 + ¸p c mct; (17)
where
¸p ´
(1 ¡ µp)(1 ¡ ¯µp)
µp
:
While the price in°ation equation will all take the form in (17), the coe±cient ¸p in front of real
marginal cost will need to be modi¯ed when we consider ¯rm-speci¯c capital.
2.2. An analytical result
We ¯rst consider a version of our model that is essentially the baseline model of Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2005). This is a case with labor indivisibility and no capital adjustment cost. We present
here a necessary and su±cient condition for local real determinacy for this version of the model with
8complete depreciation of capital. Our analytical result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The necessary and su±cient condition for local real determinacy for the case
with labor indivisibility and no capital adjustment cost and complete depreciation of capital is
¡
(1 ¡ ¯)Ty
(1 ¡ ®)(b ¡ 1)
< T¼ < min
(
(1 + ¯)Ty
(1 + ®)(1 + b)
+
2(1 + 1
¯)
1 + ®
; U;
3Ty + 3b
¯ ¡ 1
¯ ¡ 1 ¡ b
3®b ¡ 1
)
(18)
where
b ´
²y
(²y ¡ 1)®¯
; Ty ´
µ
1 ¡ ® +
b ¡ 1
¾
¶
¿y
¯
; T¼ ´
¸p(¿¼ ¡ 1)
¯
;
¢ ´
½
Ty ¡
·
®(b ¡ 1)2 + (1 ¡ ®)
µ
1
¯
¡ 1
¶
b
¸¾2
+ 4Ty(1 ¡ ¯®)b
µ
®b ¡ 1 +
1 ¡ ®
¯
¶
;
U ´
(2®b ¡ 1)Ty + ®(b ¡ 1)2 + ( 1
¯ ¡ 1)b(2®b ¡ 1 ¡ ®) ¡
p
¢
2®b(®b ¡ 1)
:
Otherwise, there is a continuum of equilibria.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) show that a strict forward-looking in°ation-targeting rule that
sets a nominal interest rate in response solely to expected future in°ation, that is, setting ¿y = 0
in (9), renders equilibrium almost always indeterminate in their baseline model. Proposition 1
serves to illustrate two points among other things. First, an increase in the degree of price rigidity
tends to help remedy the indeterminacy problem. Second, an increase in the degree of policy's
response to output can enlarge the determinacy region. The ¯rst point is rather transparent, as in
the determinacy condition characterized by (18), the price stickiness parameter µp a®ects only T¼
and the relationship is negative | T¼ is proportional to ¸p which decreases with µp. The following
corollary helps make the second point more transparent.
Corollary 1. The lower bound in (18) is negative and strictly decreasing in ¿y and each of the
three upper bounds in (18) is strictly positive and strictly increasing in ¿y.
These implications serve as a guidance for our subsequent analysis. With these points in mind,
we turn now to derive numerical results for the calibrated model.
92.3. Model calibration and numerical results
We can derive from the log-linearized equilibrium conditions (10)-(17) a self-closed system of four
¯rst-order linear di®erence equations. To begin, ¯rst substitute (11) and (12) into (10) to obtain
¾ b Ct+1 ¡ (¿¼ ¡ 1)b ¼p;t+1 = ¾ b Ct + ¿y(1 ¡ ®) b Nt + ¿y® b Kt: (19)
Second, substitute (12) into (13) to get
ky b Kt+1 = (±ky ¡ 1)b Ct + (1 ¡ ®) b Nt + [(1 ¡ ±)ky + ®] b Kt: (20)
Next, substitute (14) and (16) into (17) to get
¯b ¼p;t+1 = ¡¸p¾ b Ct + b ¼p;t ¡ ¸p(´ + ®) b Nt + ¸p® b Kt: (21)
Finally, rolling (16) and (20) one period forward and substituting both of them into (15), and
manipulating, we obtain
°c b Ct+1 + °n b Nt+1 + °k b Kt+1 = ¡¾ b Ct ¡ ²q b Kt; (22)
where
°c ´ (~ ± ¡ 1)¾ + ²q¯
µ
± ¡
1
ky
¶
;
°n ´ ~ ±(´ + 1) + ²q¯
µ
1 ¡ ®
ky
¶
;
°k ´ ¡~ ± + ²q¯
µ
®
ky
¡ ±
¶
¡ ²q:
This is a system of four ¯rst-order linear di®erence equations in three jump variables, b Ct, b ¼p;t, and
b Nt, and one predetermined variable, b Kt. Thus determinacy requires three explosive roots and one
stable root.
For our baseline calibration, we set ® to 0:33 so that the share of payment to capital in value-
added productive factors is equal to one third, as in the National Income and Product Account.
Given that one period in our model corresponds to one quarter of a year, we set ¯ = 0:99 to be
10consistent with a steady-state annualized real interest rate of 4 percent, and we set ± to 0:02 to
match the steady-state annual capital depreciation rate of 8 percent. These are standard parameter
values used in the literature. While some studies in the literature suggest that ¾ can be as low
as 0 or as high as 30, the general consensus is that it lies between 1 and 10 (e.g., Kocherlakota,
1996; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). Our results are quantitatively invariant to the choice of ¾ in its
empirically reasonable range. We therefore ¯x the value of ¾ at 2.
Our baseline value of ´ is 10, corresponding to an intertemporal hours-worked elasticity of 10%,
which lies in the middle of the empirical estimates reported in Pencavel (1986), Altonji (1986),
Ball (1990), and Card (1994) based on micro data, while we examine the cases with ´ = 5 and 20
as well, which roughly covers both the range of these empirical estimates and the values used in
many studies (e.g., Ball and Romer, 1990; Reis, 2006). As for analytical convenience many papers
in determinacy analysis assumes ´ = 0 (e.g., Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2005; Benhabib and Eusepi,
2005), we also examine our results for the this case, as well as the case with ´ = 1, as a unitary
labor supply elasticity is sometimes assumed as well.
We set our baseline value of µp to 0:33, so that the duration of a newly set price for a given ¯rm
(as well as the average frequency of price adjustment and the cross-sectional average age and average
lifetime of posted prices) is about four and half months, which lies somewhat near the upper end of
the recent empirical estimates by Bils, Klenow, and Kryvtsov (2003), Bils and Klenow (2004), and
Klenow and Krystov (2005) based on micro data. We also examine our results for the case with
µp = 0:25, which corresponds roughly to the lower end of these empirical estimates and is used in
some papers in determinacy analysis (e.g., Weder, 2006), as well as the case with µp = 0:57, which
is in line with the values used by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) and others.
We consider a value of ²y equal to 11, as in many studies featuring monopolistic competition,
such as Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) and Sveen and Weinke (2005, 2006). We also examine
our results for the case with ²y = 4, which is in line with the values used by Erceg, Henderson,
and Levin (2000) and Benhabib and Eusepi (2005), among others. The values used in many other
papers fall in between these two cases (e.g., Ball and Romer, 1990; Reis, 2006). These values cover
the range of the empirical estimates reported in Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986), Shapiro
(1987), Basu (1996), Basu and Kimball (1997), Basu and Fernald (1994, 1995, 1997), Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997), and Linnemann (1999).
11We consider ²q = 3 for the case with capital adjustment cost, as in Woodford (2003) and Sveen
and Weinke (2005, 2006), as well as ²q = 0 for the case that abstracts from capital adjustment cost,
as in many papers in determinacy analysis.
These calibrated parameter values are summarized in the upper panel of Table 1. With these
values of the fundamental parameters at hand, we can start to search for ranges of the two policy
parameters, ¿¼ and ¿y, that ensure a unique equilibrium.
It turns out that the determinacy region is characterized by an upper bound and a lower bound
for policy's response to future in°ation ¿¼ as a function of policy's response to current output
¿y, just as suggested by Proposition 1. Figures 1-15 display such upper and lower bounds|the
horizontal axis measures ¿y and the vertical axis measures ¿¼|for di®erent models under the
various parameter values (the models incorporating ¯rm-speci¯c capital, sticky wages, and both
sticky wages and ¯rm-speci¯c capital, as well as the calibration of additional parameters for the
models incorporating sticky wages are to be described below in detail). As is clear from these
¯gures, if policy's response to output is muted, then varying the degree of stickiness in the model
or other parameter values has a quantitatively negligible e®ect on the determinacy region. To be
speci¯c, if ¿y = 0, then virtually no value of ¿¼ can render equilibrium determinate. Whether with
higher price stickiness, or with higher overall stickiness through incorporating ¯rm-speci¯c capital,
sticky wages, or both into the baseline model, the upper bound and the lower always intercept the
vertical axis at essentially the same point.
While this robust failure highlights the potential importance of policy's response to output, the
e®ect of this avenue depends on the elasticity of labor supply and the degree of price stickiness.
As is apparent from the ¯gures, the tension in most cases is on the upper bound, so we will focus
our subsequent discussions on the upper bound as well. The ¯rst line (an in¯nite labor supply
elasticity) of Figure 1 (the price stickiness parameter µp = 0:57) corresponds to the labor supply
elasticity and price stickiness used in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005): here, the upper bound for
¿¼ increases fairly rapidly with ¿y and thus indeterminacy is much less likely to occur as policy's
response to current output increases. With the calibrated labor supply elasticity (the fourth line
in Figure 1), however, the upper bound for ¿¼ increases very slowly with ¿y and thus increasing
policy's response to current output increases the determinacy region only marginally. As Figure
2 illustrates, when the price stickiness parameter µp takes on its calibrated value of 0:33, the role
12of policy's response to current output in helping ensure determinacy is much weakened even with
high labor supply elasticity (the ¯rst two lines in Figure 2). With the empirically estimated values
of labor supply elasticity (the last three lines in Figure 2), the upper bound for ¿¼ is almost always
overlapped with the lower bound regardless of the value of ¿y and thus policy's response to current
output helps very little in ensuring determinacy. With even lower but still empirically justi¯able
price stickiness (Figure 3), the results are even more pessimistic.
We therefore conclude that letting policy respond to current output helps little in ensuring
determinacy in our calibrated baseline model with staggered prices and a capital rental market.
3. Incorporating ¯rm-speci¯c capital
This section abandons the assumption of a capital rental market made in the baseline model and
assumes instead ¯rm-speci¯c capital, as in Sveen and Weinke (2005).
At each date, the representative distributor sells the composite good that it fabricates from
the individually di®erentiated goods to the household and ¯rms at the unit fabricating cost (which
equals the price level of the economy). Thus it is assumed that the distributor cannot discriminate
its selling price between the household and the ¯rms, or across di®erent ¯rms. Quantity of the
composite good purchased by the household is consumed entirely in the same period and the
household faces a simple budget constraint
PtCt + Bt ¡ Rt¡1Bt¡1 · WtNt + ¦t;
while its optimal choice of consumption, bond, and labor still implies (6) and (7).
Quantity of the composite good It(f) purchased by a ¯rm f at date t is invested to accumulate
its own capital stock from Kt(f) at t to Kt+1(f) at t + 1 subject to a convex adjustment cost
It(f)
Kt(f)
= I
µ
Kt+1(f)
Kt(f)
¶
; (23)
where, as before, I(1) = ±, I0(1) = 1, and I00(1) = ²q. Thus, both the one period to build and the
convex adjustment cost for capital occur at the individual ¯rm level. As a consequence, nominal
marginal cost and labor to capital ratio are ¯rm-speci¯c and are linked to the economy-wide nominal
13wage rate as follows:
Wt = (1 ¡ ®)
·
Nt(f)
Kt(f)
¸¡®
MCt(f): (24)
At any date t, a ¯rm f's capital stock Kt(f) is given. If the ¯rm is a price adjuster at t, it chooses
the sequence fP¤
s (f);Ks+1(f);Ns(f)gs¸t, taking the price level, wage index, and aggregate demand
for the composite good in all corresponding periods, fPs;Ws;Ysgs¸t, as given, to maximize
1 X
s=t
R¡1
t;s¡1 [Ps(f)Ys(f) ¡ WsNs(f) ¡ PsIs(f)]
subject to (1), (2), (23), and
Ps+1(f) =
8
> <
> :
P¤
s+1(f) with probability 1 ¡ µp;
Ps(f) with probability µp:
(25)
If the ¯rm cannot adjust its price at t, it solves the same problem while taking its own price at t,
Pt(f), as given as well. The resultant optimal pricing decision is
P¤
t (f) =
²y
²y ¡ 1
P1
s=t µs¡t
p R¡1
t;s¡1P
²y
s YsMCs(f)
P1
s=t µs¡t
p R¡1
t;s¡1P
²y
s Ys
; (26)
Thus the optimal price is a markup over a weighted average of the ¯rm-speci¯c marginal costs in
the current and future periods in which the ¯rm is expected not to have another chance to reset
its price. The ¯rm-speci¯c capital Euler equation is
PtRt
Pt+1
@It(f)
@Kt+1(f)
=
®
1 ¡ ®
Nt+1(f)
Kt+1(f)
wt+1 ¡
@It+1(f)
@Kt+1(f)
: (27)
It can be shown through proper aggregation that equations (10)-(17) still approximates up to a
¯rst order the true equilibrium conditions, with the only modi¯cation being that ¸p in (17) is now
approximated by
¸p ´
(1 ¡ µp)(1 ¡ ¯µp)
µp
1 ¡ ®
1 ¡ ® + ®²y
:
For our local determinacy analysis, we can thus still analyze the system of the four ¯rst-order linear
di®erence equations (19)-(22) with ¸p modi¯ed as above.
14Figures 4-6 display the determinacy region for the model incorporating ¯rm-speci¯c capital
under the various parameter values. As a comparison between these ¯gures and Figures 1-3 reveals,
although replacing a capital rental market with ¯rm-speci¯c capital enlarges the determinacy region
in every case, the improvement is only marginal, especially for the cases with empirically reasonable
price stickiness (Figures 5 and 6) and estimated labor supply elasticity (the last three lines in the
¯gures). We thus conclude that incorporating ¯rm-speci¯c capital enhances only marginally the
role of policy's response to current output in helping avoid indeterminacy.
4. Incorporating staggered wages
This section abandons the assumption of a homogenous labor skill and a competitive labor market
made in the baseline model while maintaining that of a capital rental market. We assume there
is a continuum of households, each endowed with a di®erentiated labor skill indexed by h 2 [0;1],
who set nominal wages for their labor services in a staggered fashion.
At each date t, all di®erentiated skills fNt(h)gh2[0;1] are aggregated into a composite skill
Nt =
hR 1
0 Nt(h)(²n¡1)=²ndh
i²n=(²n¡1)
, where ²n 2 (1;1) is the elasticity of substitution between the
di®erentiated skills. The aggregation activity is assumed to be perfectly competitive. The resultant
demand for a type h skill is
Nt(h) =
·
Wt(h)
Wt
¸¡²n
Nt; (28)
where the wage rate Wt for the composite skill and the wage rates fWt(h)gh2[0;1] for the di®eren-
tiated skills are linked by Wt =
hR 1
0 Wt(h)1¡²ndh
i1=(1¡²n)
.
For each ¯rm f, the labor input in the production function (2) is in terms of the composite
labor, and (3) and (4) hold exactly as in the baseline model.
All households are price takers in good, bond, and capital rental markets and monopolistic
competitors in the labor market, where they set nominal wages for their di®erentiated labor skills
in a staggered fashion µ a lµ a Calvo (1983). At each date, each household receives a random signal
with a constant probability µw which forbids it to reset its nominal wage. The random signal is
identically and independently distributed across households and time. With the large number of
households which validates the law of large numbers, at each point in time there is fraction (1¡µw)
of randomly selected households that can reset wages.
15At any date t, a household h's capital stock Kt(h) and bond holding Bt¡1(h) are given. If the
household is a wage setter at t, it chooses the sequence fW¤
s (h);Cs(h);Ks+1(h);Bs(h)gs¸t, taking
the price level, wage index, rate of return on capital and bond, and aggregate demand for the
composite good and labor in all corresponding periods,
©
Ps;Ws;Rk
s;Rs¡1;Ys;Ns
ª
s¸t, as given, to
maximize
1 X
s=t
¯s¡t
·
Cs(h)1¡¾ ¡ 1
1 ¡ ¾
¡ Ã
Ns(h)1+´
1 + ´
¸
;
subject to
Ps [Cs(h) + Is(h)] + Bs(h) ¡ Rs¡1Bs¡1(h) · Rk
sKs(h) + Ws(h)Ns(h) + ¦s(h);
Is(h)
Ks(h)
= I
µ
Ks+1(h)
Ks(h)
¶
; (29)
a borrowing constraint Bs(h) ¸ ¡B, for some large positive number B, the demand schedule for
its labor skill (28), and
Ws+1(h) =
8
> <
> :
W¤
s+1(h) with probability 1 ¡ µw;
Ws(h) with probability µw:
(30)
If the household cannot adjust its wage at t, it solves the same problem while taking its own wage
at t, Wt(h), as given as well.
As is standard in the literature on staggered wage-setting, we suppose that there are (implicit)
¯nancial arrangements that make it possible to insure each household against any idiosyncratic
income risk that may arise from the asynchronized wage adjustments so that equilibrium consump-
tion and investment are identical across households, although nominal wages and hours worked
may di®er (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; Erceg et al., 2000; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans, 2005).12 As such, (6) and (8) continue to hold for aggregate consumption and capital, just
as in the baseline model with a homogenous labor skill and a competitive labor market, while (7)
12As Huang, Liu, and Phaneuf (2004) show, this assumption is made mainly for analytical convenience and an
alternative interpretation of the model can produce identical equilibrium dynamics without requiring such implicit
¯nancial arrangements for the purpose of aggregation.
16is replaced with the following optimal wage-setting decision
W¤
t (h) =
"
Ã²n
²n ¡ 1
P1
s=t µs¡t
w R¡1
t;s¡1W
(´+1)²n
s N
´+1
s PsC¾
s
P1
s=t µs¡t
w R¡1
t;s¡1W²n
s Ns
# 1
1+´²n
: (31)
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions are given by (10)-(15) and (17), along with a wage
in°ation equation,
b ¼w;t = ¯b ¼w;t+1 + ¸w
³
¾ b Ct + ´ b Nt ¡ b wt
´
; (32)
which is obtained by approximating and combining the wage-setting equation (31) and the equation
de¯ning the wage index, where
¸w ´
(1 ¡ µw)(1 ¡ ¯µw)
µw
1
1 + ´²n
:
Note that b ¼w;t ´ log(Wt=Wt¡1) is both the actual period-t wage in°ation and the percentage
deviation of the rate of wage in°ation in period t from its steady-state value.
For our local determinacy analysis, we can derive from these log-linearized equilibrium condi-
tions a self-closed system of six ¯rst-order linear di®erence equations. The ¯rst two are the same
as (19) and (20). The next two are modi¯ed versions of (21) and (22), given by
¯b ¼p;t+1 = b ¼p;t ¡ ¸p® b Nt + ¸p® b Kt ¡ ¸p b wt; (33)
(°c ¡ ~ ±¾)b Ct+1 + (°n ¡ ~ ±´) b Nt+1 + °k b Kt+1 + ~ ± b wt+1 = ¡¾ b Ct ¡ ²q b Kt: (34)
The last two are obtained by using the identity b wt = b wt¡1 + b ¼w;t ¡ b ¼p;t to rewrite (32) as
¯b ¼p;t+1 + ¯ b wt+1 = ¡¸w¾ b Ct + b ¼p;t ¡ ¸w´ b Nt + (1 + ¸w + ¯)b wt ¡ b zt; (35)
b zt+1 = b wt; (36)
where this last one is a de¯nition equation. This is a system of six ¯rst-order linear di®erence
equations in four jump variables, b Ct, b ¼p;t, b Nt, and b wt, and two predetermined variable, b Kt and
b zt. Thus determinacy requires four explosive roots and two stable root. Note that ¸p here is as
17speci¯ed in Section 2.
With staggered wages, we need to assign values for the two additional parameters, the elasticity
of substitution of di®erentiated skills, ²n, and the probability of non-adjustment in wage, µw. We set
²n to 4, the mid point of the empirical estimates by Gri±n (1992, 1996) based on micro data, which
is from 2 to 6. Our results are in fact quantitatively invariant to the choice of ²n in its empirically
reasonable range. We set µw to 0:75, in the light of the empirical evidence in Taylor (1999), Smets
and Wouters (2003), Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005), and Christiano et al. (2005).
These values are roughly in line with those used in the literature on staggered wage-setting (e.g.,
Erceg et al., 2000; Sveen and Weinke, 2006). These two parameter values are reported in the lower
panel of Table 1.
Figures 7-9 display the determinacy region for the model incorporating sticky wages under the
various parameter values. Notice the contrast between these ¯gures and Figures 1-3, especially
for the cases with a less than unit ´ (the last four lines in the ¯gures), where the role of policy's
response to current output in ensuring determinacy of equilibrium is signi¯cantly enhanced by the
presence of sticky wages. In almost all cases, the upper bound for ¿¼ increases fairly quickly with ¿y
and thus indeterminacy is much less likely to occur as policy's response to current output increases.
For moderate values of ¿y, the lower bound for ¿¼ can go much below 1, especially for the cases
with the estimated values of ´ (the last three lines in the ¯gures), implying that even very passive
response of policy to future in°ation can render equilibrium determinate.
It is also worth noting that, with sticky wages incorporated, the determinacy region is much
less sensitive to the magnitude of ´. Nevertheless, for empirically reasonable µp (Figures 8 and 9),
it calls for a moderately large response of policy to current output in order to ensure determinacy
for a large range of response of policy to future in°ation.
5. Incorporating both staggered wages and ¯rm-speci¯c capital
This section abandons both the assumption of a capital rental market and the assumption of a
homogenous labor skill with a competitive labor market, and incorporates ¯rm-speci¯c capital and
staggered wage-setting into the baseline model. The details are already spelled out in Sections
3 and 4 above. Local determinacy analysis involves examining the system of (19) and (20), and
18(33)-(36), while ¸p here is as speci¯ed in Section 3.
Figures 10-12 display the determinacy region for the model incorporating both sticky wages and
¯rm-speci¯c capital under the various parameter values. Notice the sharp contrast of these ¯gures
with Figures 1-3, Figures 4-6, and even Figures 7-9. In all cases incorporating both sticky wages
and ¯rm-speci¯c capital enlarges the determinacy region drastically and even a tiny response of
policy to current output can render equilibrium determinate for a wide range of response of policy
to future in°ation even under the baseline calibration.
To help make that contrast and this last point more transparent, we plot the determinacy
regions for the four models with baseline calibration in the same ¯gure, with a ¯ner scale across
a smaller horizon for the horizontal axis that measures policy's response to current output ¿y. As
Figures 13-15 illustrate, the determinacy region for the model featuring sticky prices (SP), sticky
wages (SW), and ¯rm-speci¯c capital (FSC) is signi¯cantly wider than the determinacy region for
any of the other three models and for all the three values of the price stickiness parameter µp.
For µp = 0:57 (Figure 13), most values of ¿¼ that satisfy the Taylor principle (i.e., ¿¼ > 1) can
ensure determinacy in the SP&SW&FSC model even for ¿y as small as 0:05, while any ¿¼ greater
than 5 would induce indeterminacy in the SP&SW model if ¿y is no greater than 0:05, and virtually
no value of ¿¼ can ensure determinacy in the SP or the SP&FSC model even for ¿y as big as 0:4.
When µp takes on its baseline value of 0:33 (Figure 14), all ¿¼ between 0:98 and 13:8 still ensure
determinacy for ¿y as small as 0:1, while any ¿¼ greater than 3:4 would lead to indeterminacy in
the SP&SW model if ¿y is no greater than 0:1. Even for µp as small as 0:25 (Figure 15), all ¿¼
between 0:99 and 9 would ensure determinacy for ¿y as small as 0:1, while any ¿¼ greater than 2:4
would lead to indeterminacy in the SP&SW model if ¿y is no greater than 0:1.
The contrasts among the four di®erent models illustrated by Figures 13-15, and as we discussed
above, reveal a nontrivial interaction between sticky wages and ¯rm-speci¯c capital that is crucial
for enhancing the role of policy's response to current output in helping avoid indeterminacy that
could potentially be caused by forward-looking in°ation targeting. The joint presence of sticky
wages and ¯rm-speci¯c capital in the sticky price model with endogenous investment empower a
tiny response of policy to output to ensure determinacy for a wide range of the policy's response
to in°ation. This is important given the recent ¯nding by Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2006) which
suggests that interest rate policy rules that feature a large response to output can lead to signi¯cant
19welfare losses.
6. Conclusion
We have explored the role of policy's response to current output activity in maintaining macroe-
conomic stability in a sticky price model with endogenous investment in which a central bank
systematically adjusts a short-term nominal interest rate to changes in expected future in°ation.
We found that virtually all interest rate policy rules that feature a muted response to output
would lead to real indeterminacy of equilibrium, regardless of price stickiness or overall stickiness
embodied in the model by incorporating ¯rm-speci¯c capital, sticky wages, or both.
This reveals the potential importance of policy's response to current output in helping avoid
macroeconomic instability that could be caused by forward-looking in°ation targeting. We have
found, however, letting policy respond to output would help little in our calibrated model with
sticky prices and a capital rental market while incorporating ¯rm-speci¯c capital would only make
a marginal improvement; in either case, only a narrow range of response of policy to future in°ation
could ensure determinacy even with a moderately large response of the policy to current output.
We have shown that incorporating sticky wages could make a signi¯cant improvement; nevertheless,
it could still call for a moderately large response of policy to output in order to ensure determinacy
for a large range of the policy's response to in°ation.
We have illustrated a nontrivial interaction between sticky wages and ¯rm-speci¯c capital that
is crucial for enhancing the role of policy's response to output in helping avoid indeterminacy. We
showed that in our full-blown model with endogenous investment that features sticky prices, sticky
wages, and ¯rm-speci¯c capital, a tiny response of policy to current output is su±cient to ensure
macroeconomic stability for a wide range of the policy's response to future in°ation. The fact that
the required output response is tiny is important in light of the recent ¯nding by Schmitt-Groh¶ e
and Uribe (2006) which suggests that a large response of policy to output can be a potential source
of signi¯cant ine±ciencies.
20Appendix
To prove Proposition 1, we use the celebrated Samuelson-Farebrother conditions for handling high
order polynomial equations. We restate these conditions here for convenience.
Theorem A [Samuelson (1947){Farebrother (1973)]. A cubic equation,
¸3 + a1¸2 + a2¸ + a3 = 0;
where a1, a2, and a3 are real numbers, has three stable roots if and only if
1 + a1 + a2 + a3 > 0;
1 ¡ a1 + a2 ¡ a3 > 0;
1 ¡ a2 + a1a3 ¡ a2
3 > 0;
a2 < 3:
These results can be found in Samuelson (1947, p. 436) and Farebrother (1973).
Proof of Proposition 1: The log-linearized equilibrium conditions (10)-(15) for the case stated
in the proposition can be combined into a system of four ¯rst-order linear di®erence equations,
2
6
6 6 6
6 6 6
4
b Ct+1
c mct+1
b ¼t+1
b Kt+1
3
7
7 7 7
7 7 7
5
=
2
6
6 6 6
6 6 6
4
1 ¡
(1¡®)¿y
®
1
¾
h
(1¡®)¿y
® ¡
¸p(¿¼¡1)
¯
i
¿¼¡1
¾¯
¿y
¾
(1 ¡ ®)¾
¡
1 ¡
¿y
®
¢ (1¡®)¿y
® ¡
¸p(¿¼¡1)
¯
¿¼¡1
¯ ¿y
0 ¡
¸p
¯
1
¯ 0
¡
(1¡®)¾
® ¡
h
1 +
(1¡®)¾
®
i
(b ¡ 1)
(1¡®)b
® 0 b
3
7
7 7 7
7 7 7
5
2
6
6 6 6
6 6 6
4
b Ct
c mct
b ¼t
b Kt
3
7
7 7 7
7 7 7
5
;
in three jump variables, C, mc, and ¼, and one predetermined variable, K. Therefore, determinacy
requires three explosive roots and one stable root. With some algebra, it can be shown that the
four eigenvalues of the above 4 £ 4 matrix can be obtained by solving for the four roots of the
21following fourth-order polynomial equation in ¸,
¸(¸3 + b1¸2 + b2¸ + b3) = 0;
where
b1 = ¡
µ
1
¯
+ 1 + b ¡ T¼
¶
;
b2 =
1
¯
¡ ®T¼ + b
µ
1
¯
+ 1 ¡ T¼
¶
+ ¯Ty; (37)
b3 = ¡
·
b
µ
1
¯
¡ ®T¼
¶
+ Ty
¸
:
Thus determinacy requires that the equation
¸3 + b1¸2 + b2¸ + b3 = 0; (38)
has three explosive roots. Clearly, a necessary condition for this to be the case is jb3j > 1. It follows
that (38) can be rewritten as
¹3 + (b2=b3)¹2 + (b1=b3)¹ + (1=b3) = 0; (39)
where ¹ = 1=¸. Thus (38) has three explosive roots for ¸ if and only if (39) has three stable roots
for ¹. Applying the Samuelson-Farebrother conditions presented in Theorem A, (39) has three
stable roots for ¹ if and only if
b3 + b2 + b1 + 1
b3
> 0;
b3 ¡ b2 + b1 ¡ 1
b3
> 0;
b2
3 ¡ b1b3 + b2 ¡ 1
b2
3
> 0;
b1
b3
< 3:
We claim that determinacy requires b3 < 0. To show this, we can substitute (37) into the
22numerator of the ¯rst two of the above inequalities to get
¡(1 ¡ ®)(b ¡ 1)T¼ ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)Ty
b3
> 0; (40)
(1 + ®)(1 + b)T¼ ¡ 2( 1
¯ + 1)(1 + b) ¡ (1 + ¯)Ty
b3
> 0: (41)
If b3 > 0, then (40) requires T¼ < 0 while (41) requires T¼ > 0, a contradiction. This is to say, only
when b3 < 0 may (40) and (41) hold simultaneously. This proves our claim. Combining this with
the requirement jb3j > 1, we can summarize the necessary and su±cient condition for determinacy
by the following inequalities:
b3 < ¡1;
b3 + b2 + b1 + 1 < 0;
b3 ¡ b2 + b1 ¡ 1 < 0;
b2
3 ¡ b1b3 + b2 ¡ 1 > 0;
b1 > 3b3:
Using (37), we can prove that the above inequalities are equivalent to
T¼ <
Ty
®b
+
1
®¯
¡
1
®b
´ U1; (42)
T¼ > ¡
(1 ¡ ¯)Ty
(1 ¡ ®)(b ¡ 1)
´ L1; (43)
T¼ <
(1 + ¯)Ty
(1 + ®)(1 + b)
+
2(1 + 1
¯)
1 + ®
´ U2; (44)
T¼ <
(2®b ¡ 1)Ty + ®(b ¡ 1)2 + ( 1
¯ ¡ 1)b(2®b ¡ 1 ¡ ®) ¡
p
¢
2®b(®b ¡ 1)
´ U3
OR T¼ >
(2®b ¡ 1)Ty + ®(b ¡ 1)2 + ( 1
¯ ¡ 1)b(2®b ¡ 1 ¡ ®) +
p
¢
2®b(®b ¡ 1)
´ L2; (45)
23T¼ <
3Ty + 3b
¯ ¡ 1
¯ ¡ 1 ¡ b
3®b ¡ 1
´ U4: (46)
The proofs of (42)-(44) and (46) are straightforward, noting that ®b > 1. To prove (45), we can
show, with some manipulations, that the original nonlinear inequality is equivalent to
G(T¼) ´ [®b(®b ¡ 1)]T 2
¼
¡
·
(2®b ¡ 1)Ty + ®(b ¡ 1)2 +
µ
1
¯
¡ 1
¶
b(2®b ¡ 1 ¡ ®)
¸
T¼
+
·
T 2
y +
µ
2b ¡ 1
¯
+ ¯ ¡ 1 ¡ b
¶
Ty + (b ¡ 1)
µ
b
¯2 ¡
b + 1
¯
+ 1
¶¸
> 0: (47)
It can be shown that the two roots to the equation G(T¼) = 0 are given by U3 and L2. Since ®b > 1
and Ty ¸ 0, we have ¢ > 0, and thus U3 and L2 are two distinct real roots, with U3 < L2. The fact
that ®b > 1 also implies that G(T¼) is a convex function of T¼. This proves that (45) is equivalent
to the original nonlinear inequality.
To sum up inequalities (42)-(46), there is a determinant equilibrium if and only if
L1 < T¼ < minfU1;U2;U3;U4g OR maxfL1;L2g < T¼ < minfU1;U2;U4g: (48)
Note that L1 < 0 < L2. In fact, with some manipulations, we can show that
L2 ¡ U1 =
p
¢ + Ty ¡ [®(b ¡ 1)2 + ( 1
¯ ¡ 1)b(1 ¡ ®)] + 2( b
¯ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)
2®b(®b ¡ 1)
:
Denote
A1 ´ Ty ¡
·
®(b ¡ 1)2 +
µ
1
¯
¡ 1
¶
b(1 ¡ ®)
¸
;
A2 ´ 4Ty(1 ¡ ¯®)b
µ
®b ¡ 1 +
1 ¡ ®
¯
¶
¸ 0;
then
¢ = A2
1 + A2:
It follows that
L2 ¡ U1 =
p
A2
1 + A2 + A1 + 2( b
¯ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)
2®b(®b ¡ 1)
¸
2( b
¯ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)
2®b(®b ¡ 1)
> 0:
24Therefore, (48) reduces to
L1 < T¼ < minfU1;U2;U3;U4g: (49)
We claim that U3 < U1. To prove our claim, ¯rst note that
U3 ¡ U1 =
¡
p
¢ + Ty ¡ [®(b ¡ 1)2 + ( 1
¯ ¡ 1)b(1 ¡ ®)] + 2( b
¯ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)
2®b(®b ¡ 1)
=
¡
p
A2
1 + A2 + A1 + 2( b
¯ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)
2®b(®b ¡ 1)
:
Thus, our claim holds true if and only if
A1 + 2
µ
b
¯
¡ 1
¶
(1 ¡ ®) <
q
A2
1 + A2:
Suppose that this is not the case and instead
A1 + 2
µ
b
¯
¡ 1
¶
(1 ¡ ®) ¸
q
A2
1 + A2:
Then
A2
1 + 4
µ
b
¯
¡ 1
¶
(1 ¡ ®)A1 + 4
µ
b
¯
¡ 1
¶2
(1 ¡ ®)2 ¸ A2
1 + A2;
(with a precondition that A1 + 2(b=¯ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®) ¸ 0), which leads to
[(1 ¡ ®) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯®)b]Ty ¸
µ
b
¯
¡ 1
¶
(1 ¡ ®)(b ¡ 1);
which is impossible since the left-hand side is negative while the right-hand side is strictly positive.
Thus our claim holds true and (49) reduces to
L1 < T¼ < minfU2;U3;U4g: (50)
It is easy to construct examples to show that U2, U3, and U4 can alternate in the order of their
magnitudes, depending on the values of the fundamental parameters. Therefore, (50) is the most
compact necessary and su±cient condition for local real determinacy. Substituting into (50) the
values for L1, U2, U3, and U4 establishes the proposition. Q.E.D.
25Proof of Corollary 1: The only nontrivial proof is for the case of the second upper bound. To
prove that U is strictly increasing in ¿y, we rewrite ¢ as
¢ =
½
Ty +
·
®(b ¡ 1)2 + (1 ¡ ®)
µ
1
¯
¡ 1
¶
b
¸¾2
¡ 4Ty®(®b ¡ 1)(¯b ¡ 1) ´ x2
1 ¡ 2Tyx2;
and use it to show that @U=@¿y > 0 if and only if
2®b ¡ 1 >
x1 ¡ x2 p
¢
:
A su±cient condition for the above inequality to hold is that
x2
1 ¡ 2Tyx2 >
µ
x1 ¡ x2
2®b ¡ 1
¶2
;
which can be shown, using x2
1 ¡ 2Tyx2 = (x1 ¡ x2)2 ¡ x2(x2 ¡ 2x1 + 2Ty), to be equivalent to
µ
x1 ¡ x2
2®b ¡ 1
¶2
> ¡(¯b ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ¯®)
µ
®b ¡ 1 +
1 ¡ ®
¯
¶
;
which clearly always holds. Thus U is strictly increasing in ¿y. This combined with the fact that
U simpli¯es to
1
®
µ
1
¯
¡ 1
¶
> 0
when ¿y is 0 implies that U is strictly positive for all ¿y ¸ 0 (this can also be checked by verifying
that L2U3 > 0 and L2 > 0, where the notations are as de¯ned in the proof of Proposition 1 above).
Q.E.D.
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32TABLE 1|PARAMETER VALUES
Parameters for All Models Values
Share of payment to capital in total value added (®) 0:33
Subjective quarterly discount factor (¯) 0:99
Quarterly depreciation rate of capital (±) 0:02
Relative risk aversion in consumption (¾) 2
Relative risk aversion in labor hours (´) f0;1;5;10¤;20g
Probability of non-adjustment in price (µp) f0:25;0:33¤;0:57g
Elasticity of substitution of di®erentiated goods (²y) f4;11¤g
Elasticity of investment to capital ratio w.r.t. Tobin's q (²q) f0;3¤g
Additional Parameters for Models with Staggered Wages Values
Elasticity of substitution of di®erentiated skills (²n) 4
Probability of non-adjustment in wage (µw) 0:75
Note: For multiple values the one with an asterion denotes the baseline calibration
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Fig. 1. Determinacy region with staggered prices and a capital rental market (µp = 0:57): Upper
bound (solid line) and lower bound (broken line) for policy's response to future in°ation ¿¼
(vertical axis) as a function of policy's response to current output ¿y (horizontal axis)
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Fig. 2. Determinacy region with staggered prices and a capital rental market (µp = 0:33): Upper
bound (solid line) and lower bound (broken line) for policy's response to future in°ation ¿¼
(vertical axis) as a function of policy's response to current output ¿y (horizontal axis)
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Fig. 3. Determinacy region with staggered prices and a capital rental market (µp = 0:25): Upper
bound (solid line) and lower bound (broken line) for policy's response to future in°ation ¿¼
(vertical axis) as a function of policy's response to current output ¿y (horizontal axis)
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Fig. 4. Determinacy region with staggered prices and ¯rm-speci¯c capital (µp = 0:57): Upper
bound (solid line) and lower bound (broken line) for policy's response to future in°ation ¿¼
(vertical axis) as a function of policy's response to current output ¿y (horizontal axis)
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Fig. 5. Determinacy region with staggered prices and ¯rm-speci¯c capital (µp = 0:33): Upper
bound (solid line) and lower bound (broken line) for policy's response to future in°ation ¿¼
(vertical axis) as a function of policy's response to current output ¿y (horizontal axis)
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Fig. 6. Determinacy region with staggered prices and ¯rm-speci¯c capital (µp = 0:25): Upper
bound (solid line) and lower bound (broken line) for policy's response to future in°ation ¿¼
(vertical axis) as a function of policy's response to current output ¿y (horizontal axis)
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Fig. 7. Determinacy region with staggered prices, staggered wages, and a capital rental market
(µp = 0:57): Upper bound (solid line) and lower bound (broken line) for policy's response to future
in°ation ¿¼ (vertical axis) as a function of policy's response to current output ¿y (horizontal axis)
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Fig. 8. Determinacy region with staggered prices, staggered wages, and a capital rental market
(µp = 0:33): Upper bound (solid line) and lower bound (broken line) for policy's response to future
in°ation ¿¼ (vertical axis) as a function of policy's response to current output ¿y (horizontal axis)
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Fig. 9. Determinacy region with staggered prices, staggered wages, and a capital rental market
(µp = 0:25): Upper bound (solid line) and lower bound (broken line) for policy's response to future
in°ation ¿¼ (vertical axis) as a function of policy's response to current output ¿y (horizontal axis)
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Fig. 10. Determinacy region with staggered prices, staggered wages, and ¯rm-speci¯c capital
(µp = 0:57): Upper bound (solid line) and lower bound (broken line) for policy's response to future
in°ation ¿¼ (vertical axis) as a function of policy's response to current output ¿y (horizontal axis)
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Fig. 11. Determinacy region with staggered prices, staggered wages, and ¯rm-speci¯c capital
(µp = 0:33): Upper bound (solid line) and lower bound (broken line) for policy's response to future
in°ation ¿¼ (vertical axis) as a function of policy's response to current output ¿y (horizontal axis)
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Fig. 12. Determinacy region with staggered prices, staggered wages, and ¯rm-speci¯c capital
(µp = 0:25): Upper bound (solid line) and lower bound (broken line) for policy's response to future
in°ation ¿¼ (vertical axis) as a function of policy's response to current output ¿y (horizontal axis)
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Fig. 13. Determinacy region for di®erent models with baseline calibration
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Fig. 14. Determinacy region for di®erent models with baseline calibration
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Fig. 15. Determinacy region for di®erent models with baseline calibration
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